Space & Astronomy/Space and Astronomy (October 1993).iso/pc/text/spacedig/v13_2/v13_271.txt

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Subject: SPACE Digest V13 #271

SPACE Digest                                     Volume 13 : Issue 271

Today's Topics:
            Slideset: Mapping the Planets
          Re: Government vs. Commercial R&D
             space shuttle design
             Re: Re: Reliability
            Re: O-Ring and Feynman
           Shuttle Status for 03/13/91 (Forwarded)
         Re: New World Profits (was Re: Space Profits

Administrivia:

    Submissions to the SPACE Digest/sci.space should be mailed to
  [e-mail].  Other mail, esp. [un]subscription requests,
  should be sent to [e-mail], or, if urgent, to
             [e-mail]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:     Thu, 14 Mar 91 19:28 CST
From: Bill Higgins-- Beam Jockey <[e-mail]>
Subject:  Slideset: Mapping the Planets
Original_To:  SPACE

Our net pal Phil Stooke [[e-mail]] has helped put
together a 40-slide set called "Mapping the Planets."  It illustrates
recent work in planetary cartography, and comes with an booklet and
information on getting your own copies of the maps.  $50 Canadian,
shipping included, from:

Roger Wheate
Geography Dept.
University of Calgary, Alberta
Canada T2N 1N4
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
[Yeah, this review I'm reading gives an e-mail address. Don't ask me
how you're supposed to transfer dollars across Bitnet...]

So, Phil.  What's in this slideset?  Can you give us more detail?
Is it only for professional cartographers and university classes, or
would the rest of us understand it too?

     O~~*           /_) ' / /   /_/ '  ,   ,  ' ,_  _           \|/
   - ~ -~~~~~~~~~~~/_) / / /   / / / (_) (_) / / / _\~~~~~~~~~~~zap!
 /       \                          (_) (_)                    / | \
 |       |                      Bill Higgins
 \       /                      Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
   -   -                        Bitnet:                [e-mail]
     ~                          Internet:             [e-mail]
                                SPAN/Hepnet/Physnet:         43011::HIGGINS

------------------------------

Date: 7 Mar 91 19:29:13 GMT
From: elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!sdd.hp.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!unix.cis.pitt.edu!pitt!nss![e-mail]  (Paul Blase)
Subject: Re: Government vs. Commercial R&D


 HS> Ah, this explains why high-bypass turbofans, supercritical
 HS> airfoils, winglets, riblets, etc. were all invented by the
 HS> commercial aviation industry?  (For the benefit of the
 HS> spectators :-), NASA invented all of these and all have been or
 HS> are being enthusiastically adopted by commercial aviation.)

Thank you, thank you, thank you.  I was wondering when somebody else would
notice that!

--- via Silver Xpress V2.26 [NR]
--
Paul Blase - via FidoNet node 1:129/104
UUCP: ...!pitt!nss!Paul.Blase
INTERNET: [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: 7 Mar 91 18:03:32 GMT
From: elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!sdd.hp.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!unix.cis.pitt.edu!pitt!nss![e-mail]  (Paul Blase)
Subject: space shuttle design

Re recent postings about the shuttle

A couple of articles in "Aerospace & Defense Science", most
recently 'Challenger...What Really Happened', by Yale Jay Lubkin [with whom
I do not always agree, by the way] describe an alternative explaination for
the Challanger disaster.  Lubkin describes the findings of William McInnis,
a "high-level engineer at Marshall", and Ali AbuTaha, who did a separate
investigation of the disaster.  According to their findings, it was not
an O-ring failure that triggered the explosion.  Rather, it was a failure
of one of the connecting struts that connect the boosters to the main tank.

During the launch, the bolts holding down the SRB's are the only thing that
hold the shuttle to the pad; these bolts are blown, and the SRB's ignited,
approximately 7 seconds after the main engines are ignited.  Since the
shuttle main engines are about 32 feet from the bolts, there is a tremendous
torque bending the whole shuttle assembly sideways (on the order of 400x10^6
inch lbs).  When the main engines ignite, the top of the shuttle bends
sideways several feet (visible on tapes of the launch) and then starts to
spring back.  When the top of the shuttle is straight once more, on the
rebound, the SRB's are lit and the bolts blown.  During this process the
whole SRB 'stack' is bent.

Lubkins (and McInnis' and AbuTaha's) allegation [which I won't go into much
detail on here] is that NASA miscalculated the torque loads on the booster
struts (by about 3X), found out about it later, and then sat on the
findings - hounding any critics (McInnis recently committed suicide).
During the launch, the strut connection failed and ripped a hole in the
main tank.  The recent 'fixes' to the O-ring joints in the SRB stacks have
not fixed this problem; the struts could fail again at any time

Any comments?

--- via Silver Xpress V2.26 [NR]
--
Paul Blase - via FidoNet node 1:129/104
UUCP: ...!pitt!nss!Paul.Blase
INTERNET: [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: 12 Mar 91 16:24:49 GMT
From: agate!linus!linus!MWVM4381.![e-mail]
Subject: Re: Re: Reliability

HST problems partially stem from a requirement to exceed the available
bounds of control.  The mirror problem was a threefold technical error
and is not a design problem but rather a management problem.  Your cost
tradeoffs are often the drivers behind the coupling of experiments.  A
good system design can prevent single points of failure but nothing can
over come poor design.
------------------------- Original Article -------------------------
Path: linus!linus!agate!bionet!uwm.edu!rutgers!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utzo
From: [e-mail] (Henry Spencer)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Reliability
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 11 Mar 91 22:59:56 GMT
References: <[e-mail]>
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Lines: 42

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Joh
>>peculiar myth within NASA that all possible problems can be anticipated,
>>and you really can be certain that the thing will work before you launch it.
>>The universe keeps trying to tell NASA that this is wrong...
>
>That last statement sounds a little too broad. Just about everything they
>launch is chock full of backup systems, and the unmanned devices have both
>on-board recovery systems and provision for ground-based reconfiguration.

All of which can handle only expected classes of failures, by and large.

On-board recovery systems and provision for reconfiguration are of limited
help if your thrusters explode when fired continuously... and we very nearly
sent Galileo up with thrusters that did exactly that.  (The thruster problem
was discovered only because TVSat 1 used the same thrusters, and it fired
them long and hard in attempts to shake its stuck solar array loose.  Had
Galileo been launched on schedule, it would have been very lucky to reach
Jupiter.  TVSat 1 went up during the post-Challenger hiatus.)

On-board recovery systems and provision for reconfiguration are of limited
use if your solar arrays flap every time you cross from sunlight into
darkness... last I heard the HST people had given up on ever being able
to get full compensation for this, as the onboard systems just don't have
enough crunch.  It would be unfair to also mention the mirror-distortion
actuators that don't have enough muscle to take the spherical aberration
out, so I won't :-).

On-board recovery systems and provision for reconfiguration didn't save
Seasat, or the Viking 1 lander, or the attitude-control system on Solar Max
either.  All of these things deal only with expected classes of problems.
They can still be blind-sided by something unexpected.

>If you're thinking of simpler multiple probes, I think that has both good
>and bad points, and has to be evaluated on the merits of each case...

Simplicity vs. multiple missions is a complex tradeoff.  But putting all
your eggs in one basket is foolish whether that basket is simple *or*
complex, because *failures do happen*.  Complex systems, while often
better equipped to cope with failures, also are more prone to them.
--
"But this *is* the simplified version   | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
for the general public."     -S. Harris |  [e-mail]  utzoo!henry

------------------------------

Date: 12 Mar 91 19:04:40 GMT
From: sdd.hp.com!think.com!eplunix![e-mail]  (Mark R. Nilsen)
Subject: Re: O-Ring and Feynman

in article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Greg Roberts) says:
>
>I have the most absoluterespect for Feynman. He took at the technical mumbo
>jumbo from the MT engineering staff, and made it crystal clear so that anyone,
>including Neil Armstrong, could understand it. Temperature. O-Ring. Failure.
>
    If you haven't read the book:

    "What do you care what othe people think"
            by R. Feynman

    I think you would enjoy it a great deal.  The second half is
    almost all related to the shuttle disaster.
--
--Mark.  [e-mail]

Disclaimer: Your assumptions are your own.

------------------------------

Date: 13 Mar 91 18:38:23 GMT
From: elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!jato!mars.jpl.nasa.gov![e-mail]  (Ron Baalke)
Subject: Shuttle Status for 03/13/91 (Forwarded)



          KSC SHUTTLE STATUS  -  WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1991  ---  10:30 a.m.
          _________________________________________________________________

             STS-37/GAMMA RAY OBSERVATORY - ATLANTIS (OV 104) - VAB HB 3
                               LAUNCH  --  EARLY APRIL

          WORK IN PROGRESS:
          *  Orbiter Interface verification tests
          *  Tile step and gap operations near nose cone
          *  SRB battery checks
          *  Vehicle frequency response test
          *  Preparations for rollout to pad 39-B
          *  Platform retractions in VAB
          *  GRO integration into Payload Changeout Room at pad B
               (arrived at pad at 4:00 a.m. today)

          WORK COMPLETED:
          *  Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen monoball electrical
               connections
          *  Leak checks of main propulsion system
          *  Hydraulic circulation and sample tests
          *  Removal of debris shields
          *  SRB APU checks

          WORK SCHEDULED:
          *  Rollout to pad 39-B targeted for 12:01 a.m. Friday
          *  Following rollout to pad:
             -  APU hot fire (Friday)
             -  Payload installation into orbiter payload bay (Sunday)
             -  Helium Signature test (Monday)
             -  Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test (T-0 on Wednesday)


                   STS-39/DoD  -  DISCOVERY (OV 103)  -  VAB HB 1
                          LAUNCH  --  LATE APRIL, EARLY MAY

          WORK IN PROGRESS:
          *  Lifting orbiter to transfer aisle

          WORK COMPLETED:
          *  Installation of aft access doors
          *  Sling lift and build up and orbiter demate operations

          WORK SCHEDULED:
          *  VAB orbiter hydraulic operations
          *  Replace flight nose wheel tire with rollover wheel tire in
               VAB transfer aisle
          *  Rollover to Orbiter Processing Facility bay 2 Thursday morning
               at 8:30 a.m.
          *  Replace ET door hinge mechanism with one from Endeavour once
               in the Orbiter Processing Facility


          STS-40/SPACELAB LIFE SCIENCES 1 - COLUMBIA (OV 102)  -  OPF BAY 1

                                   LAUNCH  -  MAY


          WORK IN PROGRESS:
          *  Water Spray boiler servicing
          *  Auxiliary power unit leak and functional tests
          *  Mid-body operations
          *  Thruster inspections

          WORK COMPLETED:
          *  External tank umbilical door drive mechanism removed and
               shipped to Rockwell plant in California Saturday (due back
               at KSC end of March)
          *  Freon loop reservicing operations
          *  APU number 2 fuel line connections
          *  APU lube hot oil flush

          WORK SCHEDULED:
          *  OMS/FRCS functional and deservicing operations
          *  Solid rocket booster stacking operations in VAB following
               STS-37 rollout operations

      ___    _____     ___
     /_ /|  /____/ \  /_ /|      Ron Baalke         | [e-mail]
     | | | |  __ \ /| | | |      Jet Propulsion Lab |
  ___| | | | |__) |/  | | |___   M/S 301-355        | Change is constant.
 /___| | | |  ___/    | |/__ /|  Pasadena, CA 91109 |
 |_____|/  |_|/       |_____|/                      |

------------------------------

Date: 13 Mar 91 03:09:15 GMT
From: zephyr.ens.tek.com!wrgate!mtdoom![e-mail]  (Dan Tilque)
Subject: Re: New World Profits (was Re: Space Profits

[e-mail] (Jack Dietz) writes:
>
>In article <[e-mail]> Dan Tilque writes:
>
>>If Columbus had not brought back a few gold nuggets and some relatively
>>worthless plants which he thought were valuable spices, Spanish
>>exploration in the New World would probably have progressed at a much
>>slower rate or even halted altogether.  However, Columbus knew
>>this and kept exploring until he had at least something valuable to
>>show for his trip.
>
>This implies that Columbus was exploring what he thought was unprofitable
>land.  In other words, he was using the money of the Spanish crown in
>order to satisfy his desire to explore, not in the interests of the
>royal pair.

Well, I was only talking about his first voyage.  (I guess I didn't
make that obvious.)  He'd promised that he would find a short way to
the Indies and needed something to show for his efforts.  If not, some
would claim he was a fraud and he might be thrown in prison or worse.
He also was quite confident that he had found the Indies.  It wasn't
his fault that there weren't any spices or gold or even the least sign
of civilization.  All he needed were a few more ships and and another
expedition and he was sure he could find the source of the spices (and
the Chinese mainland).

As far as his motivation, he wasn't just out to "boldly go where no man
has gone before".  He was ambitious -- he wanted control over all the
lands that he discovered.  He was promised that, but such promises are
quickly forgotten by rulers when convenient.

>Interesting.  If only our explorers could pull something like that
>off, leading Congress on while they encourage exploitation...

NASA administrators are good at something like this.  It's a required
ability of higher level bureaucrats.

---
Dan Tilque    --    [e-mail]

A favorite trick of Ephebian gods, he recalled, was turning into some
animal in order to gain the favours of highly placed Ephebian women.  And
one of them had reputedly turned himself into a golden shower in persuit
of his intended.            -- Terry Pratchett, _Pyramids_

------------------------------

End of SPACE Digest V13 #271
*******************